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If, as some recent research seems to suggest, the economic performance of countries
that comply with World Bank conditionality is significantly better than that of countries
that do not comply, then an important topic for research is the identification of factors
that increase the likelihood of programme countries’ compliance. This paper starts
research in this area by employing data recently released by the World Bank that allow
a classification of Sub-Saharan African programme countries according to their
compliance with adjustment lending conditionality. The empirical results are sensible
and have important implications for the design and management of policy-based
lending.1
1. Introduction
From their onset in the early 1980s a vast amount of literature has been
devoted to the assessment of the effects of structural adjustment programmes. This
effort is understandable in view of the sheer number of countries engaged in these
programmes and the amount of resources involved. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone,
thirty-seven countries have engaged in structural adjustment programmes. Structural
adjustment lending in the region has totalled $15 billion (World Bank, 1997).
In view of this it is very surprising that the economic literature has devoted no
attention whatsoever to the identification of characteristics that may distinguish
countries that comply with the policy conditions set out in adjustment programmes
from countries that, despite their formal commitment to structural adjustment, do not
comply with conditionality.
It should be obvious that the identification of such characteristics may
significantly aid in the design of appropriate policy measures, especially if, as some
research seems to suggest (World Bank, 1994; Bouton, Jones and Kiguel, 1994;
Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 1998a), the performance of compliers is significantly better
than that of non-compliers.
One explanation for the lack of research in this area - especially outside the
World Bank - may have been the lack of data on countries’ compliance with
conditionality. The World Bank (1997), however, published a classification of Sub-
Saharan countries based on their degree of compliance with policy conditions during
their adjustment period. This classification is at the core of this paper.
Thus, the objective of this paper is to begin to fill an important vacuum in the
literature by attempting to identify the factors that influence programme countries’
compliance with adjustment lending conditionality. Section 2 discusses the importance2
of focusing research on programme countries’ compliance. The index of compliance
used in this paper is also presented here. Section 3 describes the methodological
approach. Section 4 is a review of the literature on the characteristics of countries that
engage in reform programmes. It is argued that, although such characteristics are
common to both compliers and non-compliers, this review may give some hints about
the identification of factors that make compliance more likely. Possible determinants of
compliance are fully discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results of the
empirical analysis. Section 7 draws policy implications and conclusions.
2. The importance of compliance with conditionality
A number of researchers, both within and outwith the World Bank, have made
the case that a proper evaluation of structural adjustment programmes should take into
account the degree with which programme countries have implemented the policy
conditions attached to these programmes (for instance, see Summers and Pritchett,
1993; Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991).
In the early assessment of its adjustment lending operations the World Bank
had a different approach and identified reforming countries simply with the programme
countries
1 or with those programme countries (also called “EIAL”) that had borrowed
from it more extensively and for longer periods than other programme countries.
2
However, this approach is not very satisfactory since programme countries
implemented the recommended policies to different extents. Moreover, some countries
in receipt of adjustment loans abandoned reforms early or were on-again/off-again
reformers. Thus, not all programme or EIAL countries should be bundled in the same
category of reformers (Summers and Pritchett, 1993).
In its high-profile work on the Sub-Saharan African programme countries, the3
World Bank (1994) - as well as its update by Bouton, Jones and Kiguel (1994) -
concentrated on the policies actually implemented by the programme countries of the
region and classified them according to the extent of their macroeconomic reforms.
These studies showed that those countries that made the largest adjustments in their
macroeconomic policy stance had better macroeconomic performance than the
countries that had implemented less resolute macroeconomic reforms.
However, it should be emphasized that adjustment programmes include a vast
array of policies in addition to macroeconomic policies and an assessment of the
effectiveness of structural adjustment programmes should take into account the degree
of compliance with conditionality in all of these policy areas. The general unavailability
of data in this respect has been partially eased by a World Bank publication (1997),
where Sub-Saharan African programme countries are classified on the basis of their
compliance with policy conditions in all areas of the programme.
This classification is based on an index of overall compliance. To compute the
index, the policy measures normally included in structural adjustment programmes
have been classified under three headings, namely macroeconomic stabilization, public
sector management and private sector development.
Macroeconomic stabilization includes all conditions regarding fiscal deficit
reduction, fiscal revenues, public expenditure levels, exchange rate, etc. Public sector
management includes measures for civil service reform, public expenditure reform and
public enterprise restructuring and privatization. The measures under private sector
development concern financial sector reform, trade policy reform, pricing policies and
incentives, and regulatory environment.
In a second step, compliance with measures in each of these three groups has
been rated from 1 (highest) to 4 (lowest). The country index for overall compliance has4
finally been constructed by averaging the ratings for the individual groups. On the basis
of this index, the World Bank classifies countries as good, weak or poor compliers.
Using this index of compliance, Noorbakhsh and Paloni (1998a) found that
compliance is an important determinant of economic performance after controlling for
the role of the external environment, initial economic conditions, social factors and
other country-specific conditions.
The findings in both the World Bank (1994) study and Noorbakhsh and Paloni
(1998b) point to an important area for research. If adjustment programmes give
significantly better results in countries that implement the policy conditions set out in
the programmes than in countries that do not implement those conditions, then the
effectiveness of adjustment lending could be raised by an understanding of what factors
affect countries’ compliance with conditionality.
If such factors are exogenous and beyond the World Bank’s influence, the
countries that are less likely to implement an agreed programme should be identified so
that scarce resources can be switched from potential non-compliers to potential
compliers. If, as more likely, at least some of those factors are endogenous and can be
affected by the World Bank - for instance through the modification of certain
‘unsuccessful’ aspects of programmes - then the outcome of programmes would be
closer to the desired one.
The compliance index as the basis for a research on the determinants of
compliance is however liable to various criticisms.
3 First, the assessment of the degree
of compliance is inevitably subjective. Second, averaging the compliance scores may,
in certain cases, change the ranking of countries if the arbitrary number of categories
(four) for the scores is altered. Third, the ordinality of the index makes it impossible to
establish if the difference between two countries’ scores is small or large, at least5
within certain ranges. Finally, the procedure of averaging the ratings in the three policy
groups by assigning them equal weights is arbitrary.
These criticisms question the use of the index and the associated country
classification in good, weak and poor compliers. Nevertheless the force of these
criticism is in practice significantly reduced if the index is used as a blunt instrument to
separate compliers from non-compliers without trying to identify degrees of
compliance. Thus, in this paper, Sub-Saharan programme countries have been
classified simply as compliers or non-compliers on the basis of the overall index of
compliance. No distinction has been made between good and weak compliers, unlike
the World Bank (1997) paper. (The country typology as compliers and non-compliers
is reported in Appendix A).
3. Methodology
As explained, the objective of this study is to determine what affects
programme  countries’ tendency to comply with conditionality. The problem is that the
tendency to comply cannot be observed directly. What can be observed is a binary
variable that crudely separates countries into a group of compliers and a group of non-
compliers on the basis of certain behaviour that is assumed to reflect the unobservable
tendency to comply.
An appropriate methodology under these circumstances is that of the logit
regression framework.
4 The logit model has been widely employed in psychology,
sociology, medical and biological sciences but, until recently, relatively less used in
economics. It may be useful to provide some justification for its use in the context of
compliance with structural adjustment programmes.
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We assume that a continuos variable tendency to compliance, Z
*, is a linear
function of a set of conditions (vector  x) with an error term e1 as in regression
equation:
Z x
* = ¢ + b e 1 1                                                                                              (1)
where  ¢ x  is a row vector whose first element is 1 and the other elements are
explanatory variables; b 1 is a column vector of parameters.
The threshold to compliance, Z
¯ , is then:
Z x
¯ = ¢ + b e 2 2                                                                                             (2)
where b2 is the appropriate vector of parameters and e2 is the corresponding error
term for the threshold. It follows that:
Y = 1 if Z Z
* >
¯  and Y = 0otherwise
where Y is a binary variable that separates countries into groups of compliers (Y =1)
and non-compliers (Y = 0).
Then, the probability function for compliance is:
P Z P Y P Z Z P x ( ) ( ) ( ) (( ) ( ))
* = = = < = - < ¢ - =
¯ 1 2 1 1 2 e e b b
                     = - ¢ - 1 1 2 F x ( ( )) b b                (3)
P Z ( )  indicates that the probability of compliance is a function of Z, where Z itself is a
linear function of k explanatory variables.  ( ) P Y = 1  - henceforth  P( ) ￿  - denotes the
probability of the event of compliance taking place.
The term ( ) e e 2 1 -   has a cumulative distribution function, F, which with an
appropriate specification may be expressed as a logistic function. In this case,
countries change binomially from the state of non-compliance (Y = 0) to compliance
(Y = 1) as Z increases over its range. Y has a symmetric cumulative density function7
around its midpoint; that is, Y varies between 0 and 1 with a sigmond or S-shaped
curve around its midpoint as Z ranges between -¥and +¥.
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Equation (4) has a cumulative distribution function of logistic form. It postulates that
the effect of a set of conditions (variables) on tendency towards compliance is an
exponential function of the strength of such conditions (variables).
The odds (odds ratio) in favour of compliance for a country can be expressed
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where L is the logit and reflects the log of odds ratio. Equation (6) clearly shows that
as Z changes between -¥and +¥ L does the same though probabilities are bounded
between 0 and 1.
Equation (6) shows that the estimated parameter bk  gives the change in the
log of odds for a unit change in the k
th explanatory variable of Z. Then, the exponential
ofbk  is the factor by which the odds change for a unit change in the explanatory
variable k.  A positive (negative) value of bk  results in an increase (decrease) in odds8
in favour of compliance. After estimating Z, the probability of compliance for each
country may be estimated from equation (4).
  Another way of justifying the logit model is to present it within the framework
of the utility model with discrete choice.  With respect to compliance countries enjoy
two different levels of utility: U1, the utility of the state of compliance (Y = 1), and U0,
the utility of the state of non-compliance (Y = 0). We then have the following
corresponding equations:
U x 1 1 1 = ¢ + b e                                                                                               (7)
U x 0 2 2 = ¢ + b e                                                                                              (8)
We assume that compliance initially carries a higher utility than non-compliance. This
assumption can be justified on the grounds that countries agree with the suggested
programmes in the first place. Equation (3) can be re-written as:
P Z P Y P U U P x ( ) ( ) ( ) (( ) ( )) = = = < = - < ¢ - = 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 e e b b
         = - ¢ - 1 1 2 F x ( ( )) b b             (9)
The logistic function can again be suggested as an appropriate specification of the
cumulative probability distribution of the term ( ) e e 2 1 - such that Y is binary depending
on the value of utility, where the latter in turn is a function of a set of explanatory
variables.
In general, we have a continuos latent variable which in principle is not
observable. However, it is regarded as being a function of a set of conditions which in
turn, at a certain level, would result in compliance with structural adjustments
programmes. Changes in these conditions, or stimulants, have an increasing effect, at a
constant rate, on the likelihood of compliance.
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The likelihood function - corresponding to equations (3) and (9) - to be
maximised is:
L F x F x
Y Y = - ¢ - ¢ -
= = P P
1 1 2 0 1 2 1 ( ( ( )) ( ( )) b b b b                                               (10)
Given the logistic form of the cumulative probability distribution function of ( ) e e 2 1 -
this can also be written as:
L
e e Y Z Y Z =






                                                                            (11)
That is, the parameters of Z are estimated such that the observed results will be the
most likely  outcomes.
The treatment of the sample period in this paper warrants some comments. In
many evaluation studies of the effectiveness of World-Bank supported adjustment
programmes, the sample period has been selected by identifying a specific date as the
beginning of the adjustment period for all countries. For example, World Bank (1994)
fixes the beginning of structural adjustment lending in Africa at 1986. The same
procedure is followed in Corbo and Rojas (1992) to investigate both the determinants
of participation in World Bank programmes and the effectiveness of these
programmes, although they fix the beginning of the adjustment period at 1985.
This approach, however, is not appropriate since countries undertook
structural adjustment programmes at different times, with some countries completing
their operations before other countries had even begun theirs. Thus, in this paper, the
sample period varies in accordance with each country’s actual adjustment period.
The approach adopted in this paper is cross-sectional. The use of panel data is
made impossible by the nature of the dependent variable: this is fixed and does not
have time-series variation. The sample period for each country is divided into a pre-
programme and a programme period, each having a five-year duration. The choice of a10
five-year adjustment period is the same as that in World Bank (1997). Though this is
quite arbitrary, it should be pointed out that no consent has emerged in the literature
about an optimal length: for example, Corbo and Rojas (1992) use a four-year
periodization, while Bouton, Jones and Kiguel (1994) a six-year one. Since the length
of the pre-adjustment period also varies across papers, the choice made here is to have
adjustment and pre-adjustment periods of equal lengths. (Adjustment and pre-
adjustment periods for each country are presented in Appendix B).
4. The characteristics of programme countries
It is fair to say that, overall, only a limited amount of research has addressed
the question whether identifiable characteristics exist that distinguish countries that
turn to the international financial organizations for support from those that choose a
more autonomous path. Moreover, practically all of the studies in this area were
concerned with the determinants of participation in IMF programmes. Corbo and
Rojas (1992) is, to our knowledge, the only study that examined the factors affecting a
country’s decision to undertake a World Bank-supported adjustment programme.
The variables they found to be important were: the value of the external shock
7
during the programme period (1981-84) with respect to the pre-programme period
(1970-80); the change in the ratio of the current account surplus to GDP between the
programme and the pre-programme period; the change in the ratio of total debt to
GDP between the programme and the pre-programme period; the level of investment
in the programme period; the level of the real exchange rate in the programme period;
and a group of dummy variables - if the country had a programme with the IMF, if it
was a Latin American country,
8 if it was highly indebted, and if it had a rate of inflation
of over 60 percent per year during the programme period.11
Unfortunately, no explanation for the inclusion of those variables is reported in
their paper, except for the rate of inflation.
9 With respect to this variable, they argued
that countries with high levels of inflation were expected to be less likely to undertake
a programme because, before receiving a loan from the World Bank, they would have
to have achieved a certain level of progress in reducing their internal disequilibrium. If
one accepts this explanation, it should perhaps be recognized that the sign of the
coefficient of inflation may then not be determined a priori since one could equally
argue that countries with poorer economic performance, for example higher inflation,
are more likely to enter a programme.
10
The justification for the inclusion of the other variables is left to guesswork. It
may be argued that a country is more likely to undertake a World Bank programme if
it has been hit by a negative shock and is in external disequilibrium, as expressed by
current account deficits and debt burdens.
11
A country with a relatively low ratio of gross investment to GDP may be more
likely to undertake structural adjustment. A low investment ratio may indicate not only
limited access to international capital markets but also limited imports of capital and
intermediate goods as well as distorted domestic credit markets.
12
The probability of programme participation was found to be positively
correlated with a more depreciated real exchange rate during the programme period.
This raises obvious issues of simultaneity since the real exchange rate is likely to
depreciate more in programme countries during their adjustment period than in other
countries. One explanation for the positive correlation that does not encounter a
simultaneity problem may be that the depreciation of the real exchange rate less than
fully reflects the depreciation of the equilibrium rate.
13
The finding that countries with an IMF programme are more likely to12
undertake a World Bank programme may reflect the fact that an agreement with the
IMF is often a precondition for a Bank programme or may be seen as a proxy for a
host of political and social characteristics: the fact that the country has already entered
an agreement with the IMF may imply that certain political and social conditions for
the acceptance of an adjustment programme are already in place or may simply indicate
that the country is already familiar with the modalities of dealing with international
financial institutions.
Finally, Latin American countries were found to be less likely to undertake a
World Bank programme. This may also be related to some political and social
characteristics.
Studies on the factors affecting participation in IMF programmes highlight
dimensions that are broadly similar to those raised by Corbo and Rojas (1992) with
respect to World Bank programmes (see Conway, 1994; Edwards and Santaella,
1993;
14 Joyce 1992; Knight and Santaella, 1997; McDonald, 1986). Empirically, these
dimensions appear to have some robustness, though the different variables that have
been used to measure the dimensions do not.
To somewhat summarize their findings, these studies point to five major
dimensions affecting the decision to undertake an IMF programme. The first is the
deterioration in the economic performance. This has been measured by a number of
variables such as the current account balance (as a proportion of GDP), the rate of
growth of GDP (or GDP per capita), export growth, the investment to GDP ratio,
inflation, and the real exchange rate.
A second factor affecting programme participation is the occurrence of adverse
external shocks. These have been modelled by the growth in export markets, the
growth in terms of trade and the world real rate of interest for the country. However,13
only the latter has been reported as significant in one study, i.e. Conway (1994).
A third determinant of programme participation is a country’s ability to
implement an adjustment programme autonomously. This has been measured by the
level of GDP per capita
15 - to reflect the fact that richer countries will be less reliant on
IMF funds and will be more able to change the level of expenditures - or by the
country’s GDP per capita relative to that of the United States - to denote the
availability of technical expertise.
 The fourth factor affecting the decision whether to seek financial support from
the IMF is the deterioration in the ability to finance an external deficit. The stock of
international reserves (as a proportion of imports) consistently turns out to be a
significant variable. Other variables that are significant only in some studies and are not
always used are: the external debt service (as a proportion of exports), the debt to
GDP ratio, net FDI as a proportion of GNP, the net foreign assets ratio.
Finally, previous participation in IMF programmes and the amount of funds
drawn down in such programmes are important determinants.
In certain studies, the estimated regression included indicators of domestic
policies such as the expansion of domestic credit, the government to GDP ratio and the
(rate of change of the) nominal exchange rate.
16
Unlike the other studies, Edwards and Santaella (1993) included political and
institutional variables. They argued that countries with more stable political regimes,
dictatorial regimes and left-leaning governments are less likely to seek IMF assistance.
However, their attempt was overall not very successful since, with the exception of the
frequency of attempted coup d’état - a proxy for political instability - none of the other
four political and institutional variables included was significant at normal confidence
levels.14
Edwards and Santaella (1993) also attempted to identify the circumstances
under which devaluation programmes are more likely to end up in failure. They argued
that the reasons for the adoption of inconsistent macroeconomic policies should be
sought in the characteristics of these countries’ political systems. However, none of the
variables reflecting political instability, political weakness, political ideology,
democracy or IMF presence turned out statistically significant.
5. Determinants of compliance
In the absence of previous work in this area, the identification of determinants
of compliance can only proceed by intuition. In this respect the previous section has
been useful in highlighting the major characteristics of programme countries. On one
hand these characteristics equally apply to compliers and non-compliers and cannot,
therefore, be considered as possible determinants of compliance. On the other hand,
however, they provide some hints as to what factors are likely to be important.
As a rough organizing principle, the outcome of compliance may be seen as
depending on both the willingness and the capacity to comply.
17 In this paper it is
suggested that the capacity to comply is affected by two main factors. One is the extent
of the internal and external disequilibria facing the country. If, as documented in the
previous section, programme countries undergo a deterioration in economic
performance during the pre-programme period both domestically and externally, it is
likely that the seriousness of the crisis will affect compliance. On one hand it may be
argued that the deeper the crisis, the more a country will strive to pursue an adjustment
(Drazen and Grilli, 1993).
18 On the other hand, it may also be the case that compliance
is made more difficult in an extensive crisis, especially if the required adjustment is
large.
1915
In this paper, two variables have been chosen to represent the depth of the
crisis, namely the growth in the real effective exchange rate in the pre-programme
period and the fiscal balance in the pre-programme period. These particular variables
have been chosen not only as proxies for external and internal disequilibria but also
because their adjustment involves unpleasant trade-offs. Real exchange rate
appreciation causes external deficits but, on the other hand, helps repress inflation.
Structural reforms call for an adjustment in the real exchange rate at the cost of
increasing the debt burden and raising inflation. Larger budget deficits require larger
expenditure cuts that are more difficult in situations where the room for raising
revenue through taxation is limited and where government expenditure is rather
inflexible because the state is a major employer and the only provider of social services.
In this case, policymakers have to weigh the need for adjustment against the risk of
possible political unrest.
The second factor determining the capacity to comply is the occurrence of
negative exogenous shocks.
20 For African countries, important shocks are represented
by gyrations in their terms of trade. In this paper, the shock variable is measured as the
growth in terms of trade between the programme and the pre-programme period. This
particular formulation has the advantage that it captures the occurrence of shocks in
the programme period as well as the reversion to ‘normal’ values after a shock during
the pre-programme period.
The willingness to comply may be determined by a number of factors. It could
be argued that the amount of funds potentially available to a country as a result of
compliance with policy conditions will affect a country’s willingness to comply. A
variable that reflects the availability of funds is the ratio of adjustment lending
commitments to GNP. It is suggested that the larger the commitments, the greater the16
effort that the country will make in attempting to comply with the policy conditions.
A second factor that may affect compliance is the country’s economic
performance during the adjustment period. Although one could make the argument
that if the economy is recovering countries may be tempted to relax austerity, it is also
possible that compliance with structural adjustment measures is made easier by good
economic performance (Mosley and Weeks, 1993). The variable chosen to represent
this is the growth rate of GDP during the programme. Under certain conditions, this
choice may or may not introduce a simultaneity bias.
21
The willingness to comply with conditionality is also determined by political
and social characteristics. It should be noted, however, that the political economy
literature is of limited help in identifying relevant variables since it is typically
concerned with “why” or “when” a country chooses to reform and very rarely with the
question why a country initiates a reform but then subsequently chooses not to
implement the reform package.
In addition to the fact that this literature provides few unequivocal indications
on the type of governments that are more likely to comply with the conditions attached
to an adjustment programme, there is also the problem that the political economy
variables used in the empirical literature are often in the form of decade averages or are
measured at a precise point in time, which is unsuitable for describing characteristics
during the programme period.
Nevertheless, this literature provides a particularly useful insight for the
purpose of this paper: the success of structural reforms will depend upon the
investment response of the private sector. If the private sector believes that structural
reforms will be sustained, it will react to the new price signals by investing and the
reforms will succeed. If reforms are not believed to be sustainable or their future is17
uncertain, the private sector will hold back investment and the reforms will be
abandoned (Dornbusch, 1991). There are many reasons that may lead to such
expectations about the future of structural reforms, namely political instability, lack of
government  credibility, high inequality in the distribution of the expected costs and
benefits of reforms, etc.
A variable that may capture these political economy arguments is the change in
the gross domestic investment to GDP ratio between the programme and the pre-
programme period. It should perhaps be noted that the inclusion of this particular
variable may also be justified on the basis of other considerations. For example, an
increase in the investment ratio may be the result of improved access to international
capital markets.
Another factor that may determine compliance with policy conditionality is the
country’s degree of development, which could be approximated by its level of income.
In low income countries a contraction in the role of government and a re-orientation of
its expenditure are more difficult. Moreover, since standards of living are lower it is
more difficult to implement and to muster support for structural reforms that tend to
bring about benefits only after an initial period of austerity. A dummy variable taking
value one for low income countries and zero otherwise has been used in the
regressions.
6. The empirical results
The results of the logistic model regression for the determinants of compliance
are presented in Table 1.18







(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALCGNP 5.057 2.484 4.144 0.042
TOTg 0.241 0.139 3.015 0.082
gRER-1 0.370 0.204 3.283 0.070
dIGDP 0.468 0.293 2.552 0.110
gGDP 1.558 1.046 2.217 0.136
FBGDP-1 0.767 0.558 1.885 0.170
LIdum -8.944 5.261 2.890 0.089
Constant 0.807 4.211 0.037 0.848
The estimated coefficients have sensible signs and according to the Wald
Statistic are statistically significant at worst at the 17 percent confidence level.
22 The
constant in not significantly different from zero.
23
  The results show that a larger real appreciation of the exchange rate and a
larger budget deficit in the pre-programme period (lower gRER-1 and FBGDP-1) make
compliance less likely. On the other hand, a larger adjustment package (higher
ALCGNP) increases the chances that countries would strive to comply with policy
conditions. The probability of compliance increases in a more favourable economic
environment: better growth performance of the economy (higher gGDP) and more
favourable terms of trade (higher TOTg) improve the likelihood of compliance with
conditionality.
The increase in the investment to GDP ratio between the programme and the
pre-programme period (dIGDP) also makes compliance more likely. It should be
pointed out that the fact that both GDP growth and the investment ratio are significant19
at the same time suggests that the increase in the investment ratio should not be
interpreted simply as a proxy for economic recovery but more as a reflection of the
influence of other factors, such as political economy conditions. Finally, low income
countries (LIdum) are significantly less likely to comply.
Since the logit model is non-linear, the partial effects on compliance deriving
from unit changes in one of the regressors while keeping the others constant are not
equal to the estimated coefficients. Table 2 reports these computed partial effects on
both the odds in favour of compliance and the associated probability of compliance.
Table 2. Partial effects on odds and probability of compliance








(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALCGNP 157.116 1.134 16.278 1.940
TOTg 1.272 1.026 3.012 0.359
gRER-1 1.448 1.038 0.071 0.008
dIGDP 1.596 1.047 1.185 0.141
gGDP 4.749 1.104 3.054 0.364
FBGDP-1 2.153 1.068 4.927 0.587
LIdum 1.31E-04 -1.135 - -
Column (1) of this table reports the factor by which the odds in favour of
compliance would change for a unit change in a relevant explanatory variable.
24 For
example, for a 1 percentage point (a unit) increase in the ratio of adjustment lending
commitments to GNP the odds in favour of compliance would increase by a factor of
157.12, while an increase of 1 percentage point in the growth rate of real GDP in the
adjustment period would increase the odds in favour of compliance by a factor of 4.75.20
Column (1) shows that a country’s income status has a large effect on odds: everything
else equal, the odds of compliance for a low income country are 0.001 times smaller
than for a middle income country.
Since the concept of probability may be somewhat more intuitive than that of
odds, Column (2) reports the factor by which the probability of compliance would
change for a unit change in explanatory variables. This factor of change in probability
has been calculated by taking as the initial level of probability that of a low income
country when all explanatory variables are at their mean values.
25
Column (2) shows that, for a country where the explanatory variables are at
their mean values, adjustment lending commitments and income status have,
quantitatively, practically the same impact on the probability of compliance. These
variables have stronger effects on the probability of compliance than any other variable.
The third variable in order of importance is the growth rate of GDP during the
adjustment period.
Since a unit change can be a large amount for some explanatory variables and a
small one for others, the relative size of these changes on odds and probability of
compliance is obviously influenced by the scales of the individual explanatory variables.
To have a scale-free measure one can compute the elasticity of odds in favour of
compliance
26 and the elasticity of the probability of compliance
27 with respect to
changes in the explanatory variables: these are reported in Column (3) and (4)
respectively. The reported elasticities have been calculated at the means of the
explanatory variables.
The results show that a one percentage change in the adjustment lending
commitment to GNP ratio will increase the odds in favour of compliance by 16.3
percent and the probability of compliance by 1.9 percent. These effects are stronger21
than for any other variable.
28 The second largest elasticities are those with respect to
the fiscal balance to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period. Next are the elasticities
with respect to the rate of growth of GDP and the rate of growth of terms of trade.
Quantitatively, these are similar. Smaller elasticities are those with respect to the
change in the investment to GDP ratio and the rate of growth of the real exchange rate
during the pre-programme period.
The goodness of fit of the model can be gauged in a number of ways. The null
hypothesis that all coefficients excluding the constant are jointly equal to zero is
rejected at the 1 percent confidence level:
29 this indicates that the overall fit of the
estimation is good.
Since the model can be used to forecast a country’s likelihood of compliance
on the basis of certain variables, it is important to assess the forecasting performance
of the model further. One method evaluates the accuracy of the model predictions with
respect to the observed outcomes. Table 3 presents cross-tabulations of the predicted
number of compliers and non-compliers against the observed frequency of these cases.
As can be seen from this table, the model correctly predicts 21 of the 23 cases
considered: this gives an accuracy ratio of 91.3 percent.
30 The logit regression shows
one ‘false positive’ (prediction of compliance when in fact there was no compliance)
and one ‘false negative’ (prediction of non-compliance when the country complied).
The countries concerned are Chad and Burkina Faso, respectively.
Table 3. Accuracy of the predicting equation.
               Predicted
Observed
No compliance Compliance Percent correct
No compliance 7 1 87.5
Compliance 1 14 93.3
Overall - - 91.322
Another method of evaluation focuses on the precision of forecasts. The Cut
Value for Table 3 is 0.5; that is, all cases which have been predicted to have a value
greater than 0.5 (to 1) are classified as compliers and all those with the predicted value
of less than 0.5 (to 0) are regarded as non-compliers. The more these two groups are
away from the mid-point and cluster at their respective ends the higher is the precision
of the estimated model.  Figure 1 reveals a high precision for the estimated model. All
correctly predicted compliers have a probability between 0.8 to 1 while the probability
of the non-compliers complying falls between 0 to 0.3 range with concentration
between 0 and 0.1.














































This paper has estimated a logit regression model in an attempt to identify
empirically the factors that increase the likelihood of programme countries complying
with the policy conditions set out in adjustment programmes. The results suggest that
compliance is affected by the seriousness of the economic crisis facing the country and,23
therefore, the harshness of the required adjustment. A favourable external environment
as well as good economic performance are both important determinants. Compliance is
also made more likely by an investment recovery, which reflects appropriate political
conditions such as a good degree of political stability and credibility of the reform
programme. A low level of development makes compliance harder. This may be due to
limited infrastructure, difficulty in implementing strong corrections of policy
instruments or limited technical and administrative capacity to implement the reforms.
Finally, larger financial support increases the cost of not complying.
In the data set, about one-third of programmes supported by the World Bank
were not implemented. To put it in another way, over $4.3 billion were not put to the
use they were intended for. Can the World Bank do anything to increase the chances
that programme countries will comply with the policy conditions? In this respect, the
paper has a number of important policy implications.
The empirical result that a rise in the investment ratio increases the likelihood
of compliance highlights the importance of the political and institutional environment.
In this respect, there seems to be some support for the view that development agencies
should have a deeper understanding of the political economy of different countries so
as to transfer their resources towards countries that are more politically stable.
A recovery of investment also requires that the private sector be persuaded of
policy makers’ commitment to reform and sustainability of the reform programme.
However, on its own, the prescription that reforms should be credible and believed to
be sustainable is rather hollow since the credibility and sustainability of reforms is
endogenous: the design of adjustment programmes is thus at least as important as the
identification of politically stable countries.
With respect to programme design, the paper suggests three aspects where this24
could be improved. One concerns the speed and the extent of reforms. The finding that
compliance is less likely when the required adjustment is larger could reflect the fact
that structural adjustment programmes may envisage a speed of reform that is too fast
and/or a range of reforms that is too broad.
Some policy implications of this empirical finding are, however, ambiguous
without further research. One interpretation of the evidence is that, under certain
circumstances - essentially when the disequilibrium is very large - reforms should be
more gradual, for example because the supply response tends to be slow (Noorbakhsh
and Paloni (1998b). Another view is that, in those conditions, reforms should be less
ambitious in scope but not less radical: this is the narrow-but-deep approach to policy
reforms formulated by Rodrik (1990). Whatever the merits of these positions, the
empirical evidence seems to indicate that the big bang approach to reforms will only
make compliance less likely.
A second implication for the design of programmes derives from the result that
good economic performance makes compliance more likely. This seems to suggest that
reform programmes should pay more attention to economic growth even within a short
horizon so that adjustment is no longer associated with protracted stagnation.
The third aspect where the design of programmes could be improved is
suggested by the finding that low income countries are less likely to comply.
Modifications to the programmes to account for a broader role of government in these
societies and special arrangements to reduce the hardship in adjustment programmes
should be introduced. The focus on the social dimensions of adjustment and the
problem of poverty reduction in the programmes supported since the late 1980s may
be seen as addressing this particular concern. The extent to which these more recent
programmes have been successful in improving compliance remains to be seen.25
The final policy implication is a consequence of the empirical result that the size
of financial support affects the likelihood of compliance. It may be argued that, in
difficult situations, once the characteristics of a certain country are evaluated
favourably and a reform programme is deemed as likely to be agreed with the country,
the financial support provided by the World Bank should be generous. A mean
package in a crisis situation is unlikely to stimulate the response needed for the success
of reforms.
These are important policy implications that deserve further investigation to
evaluate their robustness. Moreover, although they draw support from the empirical
analysis conducted in this paper, the econometric results should be interpreted with
caution. The limited number of observations implies that the estimation results are not
very robust to alternative specifications, although from our trials the importance of
many of the dimensions identified in this paper was confirmed.
An objective of this paper was to draw attention to the importance of
identifying the factors that make countries more likely to comply with conditionality
since this may have implications for the design and management of policy-based
lending. Although the empirical results are sensible and encouraging, in the absence of
previous work on this topic, they must be considered as preliminary. The research
agenda is long.26
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*, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea
*, Guinea-Bissau
*,




*, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Non-compliers
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea
*,
Gabon, Kenia





Countries with an asterisk are not in the regression sample only due to lack of data.
APPENDIX B.
Adjustment periods
Pre-Adj. Adj. Pre-Adj. Adj.
Benin 1984-88 1989-93 Mauritania 1981-85 1986-90
Burkina Faso 1986-90 1991-95 Mauritius 1976-80 1981-85
Burundi 1981-85 1986-90 Mozambique 1983-87 1988-92
Cameroon 1984-88 1989-93 Niger 1981-85 1986-90
CAR 1982-86 1987-91 Nigeria 1982-86 1987-91
Chad 1984-88 1989-93 Rwanda 1986-90 1991-95
Congo 1983-87 1988-92 Sao Tome 1982-86 1987-91
Cote d’Ivoire 1977-81 1982-86 Senegal 1981-85 1986-90
Equat. Guinea 1981-85 1986-90 Sierra Leone 1987-91 1992-96
Gabon 1983-87 1988-92 Somalia 1981-85 1986-90
Gambia 1982-86 1987-91 Sudan 1975-79 1980-84
Ghana 1978-82 1983-87 Tanzania 1982-86 1987-91
Guinea 1981-85 1986-90 Togo 1978-82 1983-87
Guinea-Bissau 1980-84 1985-89 Uganda 1983-87 1988-92
Kenya 1975-79 1980-84 Zaire 1981-85 1986-90
Madagascar 1980-84 1985-89 Zambia 1986-90 1991-95
Malawi 1976-80 1981-85 Zimbabwe 1987-91 1992-96
Mali 1983-87 1988-9230
Notes
1 This was the procedure followed in World Bank (1988) which was the first evaluation report on its
adjustment lending operations.
2 EIAL stands for Early Intensive Adjustment Lending countries. To be precise, EIAL countries were
those that received two or more structural adjustment loans (SALs) or three or more adjustment loans
(SALs or sectoral adjustment loans (SECALs)) starting in 1985 or before. See World Bank (1990).
3 At least some of these criticisms are common to those raised towards the index of macroeconomic
adjustment presented in World Bank (1994). See Mosley, Subasat and Weeks (1995).
4 In fact, in studies of the decision to participate in World Bank or IMF programmes, both logit and
probit models have been employed. However, as pointed out by Maddala (1983, p.23) “because the
cumulative normal distribution and the logistic distribution are very close to each other, except at the
tails, we are not likely to get very different results using…the logit or the probit methods, unless the
samples are very large (so that we have enough observations at the tails)”. Moreover, under certain
conditions, the two models are equivalent (see Poirier, 1978).
5 McFadden (1974) and (1977), Maddala (1983), Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) and Cramer (1991)
provided various justifications for the use of the logit model in economics.
6 Since the derivative of an exponential function is proportional to the value of the function, positive
changes in its arguments would increase the value of the function at a constant rate.
7 The external shock (as a percentage of GDP) was measured as the sum of real interest rate and terms
of trade effects.
8 A dummy for African countries was not significant.
9 To be fair to the authors, it should be said that the focus of their paper was not on the determinants
of programme participation but on the effectiveness of adjustment programmes.
10 In fact, in studies on the determinants of IMF programme participation where the inflation
coefficient is significant, its sign is positive (see Knight and Santaella, 1997; McDonald, 1986).
11 If this interpretation is correct, however, it is not immediately clear why current account deficits
and debt burdens were measured as differences between the adjustment and the pre-adjustment period
rather than, for instance, as levels in the pre-adjustment period.
12 This interpretation, however, would suggest that the relevant investment ratio would be that in the
pre-programme period rather than that during the programme.
13 In this case, however, it seems that the relevant real exchange rate should be that in the pre-
programme period.
14 Strictly speaking the paper by Edwards and Santaella (1993) is slightly different from the others in
that it analyses the factors affecting the decision of a country to devalue its currency in the context of
IMF programmes.
15 Conway (1994) tried the ratio of agricultural value added to GDP but was not significant.
16 The inclusion of policy variables may introduce a possible simultaneity bias. Precisely for this
reason Joyce (1992) re-estimated his model without the policy variables previously included.
17 The use of these two terms does not imply that there is a clear separation between them. For
example, if the country is hit by an adverse external shock that reduces its capacity to comply, it is
possible that its willingness to comply may also diminish. Likewise, a deterioration in the country’s
economic performance may reduce its willingness as well its capacity to comply. These considerations
suggest that terms such as willingness and capacity should be interpreted flexibly.
18 However, as pointed out by Rodrik (1996), the proposition that crisis ‘causes’ reform has a strong
element of tautology and is virtually non-falsifiable.
19 This could be due, among other factors, to the fact that structural adjustment loans include normally
a large numbers of policy conditions (Toye, 1994).
20 The formulation of policy conditions is generally not explicitly contingent.
21 The way the risk of simultaneity bias is reduced in studies using a similar methodological approach
is by lagging the explanatory variable. In this paper, however, in the absence of a time series for the
dependent variable, lagging the rate of growth of GDP would have meant to use the rate of growth of
GDP during the pre-programme period. This would not have captured the dimension that should be
modelled, that is that compliance is easier when the economy is doing well. It should also be noted
that the problem of simultaneity exists only if compliance has an immediate, rather than lagged, effect
on growth.31
22 The Wald Statistic for a variable with a single degree of freedom is computed as ( $ / $ ) b sb k k
2
which has a  c
2  distribution.
23 The mathematical interpretation of the constant is straightforward: if the constant is not
significantly different from zero and all explanatory variables are equal to zero, the odds ratio equals
1, that is a 50:50 chance in favour of compliance (or no compliance). It should be noted that a
parameter or the constant being equal to zero means that there is no effect on the log of odds because
the exponential of zero is equal to unity. To see this note that:
 Z X X X k k = + + + + b b b b 0 1 1 2 2 ...
The odds from equation (5) can then be written as:
 e e e e e e
Z X X X X X X k k k k = =
+ + + + b b b b b b b b 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 ... ...
which indicates that the effect of each exponential is multiplicative.
24 The factor of change in odds is given by the exponential of  $ bk .
25 The figures in Column (2) have been obtained through the following steps. First, by using the
exponential of  $ bk  one can calculate the odds in favour of compliance resulting from a unit change in
the explanatory variables. Second, the associated probability of compliance are calculated from these
odds and compared with the probability of compliance for a low income country when all explanatory
variables are at their mean values. Of course, the calculation of the factor of change in probability of
compliance for a country that changes its status from middle to low income while everything stays
constant has taken as the initial level of probability that of a middle income country.
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The calculations reported in Column (4) assume that the odds in favour of compliance (e
z) appearing
in the formula are those of a low income country where the explanatory variables are at their mean
value.
28 The concept of elasticity is not meaningful for dichotomous 0-1 variables: the elasticities of odds
and probability of compliance have thus not been calculated for the low income dummy.
29 The likelihood ratio test statistic, which has  a  c
2 distribution, is equal to 19.49 and significant at
1% level ( the critical value for 7 degree of freedom at 1% level of significance is 18.47). The model’s
c
2  test is comparable to the F test for regression. The likelihood ratio is the difference between -2LL
(-2 times log of likelihood) for the base line restricted model (the model with only a constant) and -
2LL for the model including all the explanatory variables. The degrees of freedom are determined by
the difference in the number of parameters to be estimated in these models.
30 Knight and Santaella (1997) argue that this measure is analogous to R
2 in regression.